-Oscar Gill-Lewis
After a landslide election victory, Claudia Sheinbaum is attempting to pass a series of judicial reforms requiring 7,000 judges to submit to popular elections, presenting these reforms as pro-democratic. In reality, they only serve to consolidate President Sheinbaum’s power.
Judicial Elections are not necessarily a bad idea. Other countries, like the United States and Switzerland, also elect some of their judges. The main difference lies in the scope of the reforms. Under them, all judges in Mexico would be elected. Even in the most similar case study, Bolivia, the changes were not applied to the entire judiciary. That nation’s judicial elections reform was implemented in 2009 by then-president Evo Morales. In Bolivia, judges who could run as candidates were selected according to the government’s political vision or, at least, those who sympathized with it. With the resulting courts staffed with allies, Bolivian politicians then turned to them to persecute their political rivals. Bolivia even suffers power struggles that have delayed judicial elections.
Why does President Sheinbaum believe the outcome will be different in Mexico? These elections will make all who run even more vulnerable to the influences of politicians seeking to corrupt them, orienting them toward those politicians’ particular interests. This is especially serious, given that most who run will have already been pre-selected by the Morena party. If running for election has the potential to corrupt these judicial candidates, Sheinbaum is almost guaranteeing it with this pre-selection.
Furthermore, the policy changes would create a Judicial Discipline Court, whose members would also be popularly elected and would have broad powers to investigate and possibly even remove or prosecute judges. The court’s decisions would be final and not subject to appeal. The plan would also separate the judiciary from its oversight body, the Federal Judiciary Council. Currently, the president of that council—which, among other functions, appoints federal judges and also disciplines them—is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (SCJN). Although this oversight body has made mistakes or abused power in the past, this does not mean that oversight bodies are, in principle, a mistake.
The reforms President Sheinbaum has approved propose that over 7,000 judges and magistrates be elected by popular vote for two years, instead of being appointed. Before this reform, appointments were primarily based on qualifications and acquired training. Now, judges can run with much less stringent requirements. The reform will also subject these judges to review by a disciplinary committee made up of elected officials. In June 2025, voters will elect all Supreme Court members, members of an oversight tribunal, and approximately half of Mexico’s judges. The rest will be elected in 2027.
José Ramón Cossío, a legal scholar, fears this reform could trigger a constitutional crisis in Mexico, as it will make judges focus more on the needs and desires of the ruling party or the voters who elected them.
Others have argued that the reforms will endanger the rule of law by politicizing the courts. Furthermore, they would profoundly weaken the country’s checks and balances, giving the Morena party even greater control over Mexico’s judges.
It’s true that the judiciary requires reforms, but not reforms driven by this government with a far-left agenda. Popular elections of the judiciary don’t have to deal a fatal blow to constitutional democracy. The main flaw in these reforms is that they heavily favor candidates aligned with the views of the ruling Morena party, which would undermine necessary checks and balances on executive power.
If election candidates were selected from a broader pool and each was rated by an independent organization, such as a bar association, based on factors like corruption or performance in qualifications, selection programs, or examinations, the public would be better informed of candidates’ competence and potential for judicial fairness (i.e., lack of corruption). Additionally, there would be more candidates than just those selected by the ruling party, which would improve independence from the executive branch.
Furthermore, higher-level judges, such as Supreme Court justices, should be appointed as in the United States and confirmed by the Senate. Even with appointments the U.S. Supreme Court is still politicized, and direct elections in Mexico will only exacerbate the problem. Therefore, I suggest maintaining limits on how many judges can be appointed to the Supreme Court. It’s also important that judicial renewal be staggered so the ruling party doesn’t appoint all judges who sympathize with the same party at once.
These reforms represent a serious threat to Mexico’s republican institutions. Reform advocates claim they will greatly help address widely recognized problems like corruption and nepotism. However, deeper analysis suggests they will lead to a regression of republican institutions and produce even greater corruption, as the judiciary will be even more conditioned by the ruling party’s desires. Moreover, it opens the door to future centralizing reforms, making it easier for President Sheinbaum to further consolidate power. These reforms must be fought at all levels, and the courts must not yield so easily, nor should protesters abandon the fight against these reforms.